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EVERT VAN DER ZWEERDE
CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGY: A MATTER OF FREEDOM
‘We will not get freedom from anywhere, if we do not take the decision to be 
free.*
(MotroSilova 1991,461)
KEY WORDS: civil society, ideology, rule of law, philosophy of history, 
civilization
In this paper, I want to elaborate some ideas regarding the state of 
late Soviet and post-Soviet Russia with respect to what is generally 
labelled ‘civil society’, as it is understood in Russian philosophy 
today. I shall discuss three topics. The first is a discussion that 
took place during the perestrojka years among Soviet philosophers 
and legal specialists on legality, rule of law, and civil society. The 
second is occasioned by the well-known position taken by Francis 
Fukuyama in his The End of History; I attempt to situate it in the 
Russian context. The third topic is the attempt by Nelli MotroSilova 
to assist Russia in its ‘return to Civilization’ (with a capital C) by 
making the concept of civilization ‘work’ in Russian society.
Two themes will return at several instances, which makes it 
appropriate to start by discussing them separately. The first is the 
distinction of formality and materiality, of form and content, in 
discussions about law, civil society, and civilization. The ‘formal’ 
nature of Western democracy has often been, to Russian thinkers, an 
important ground for rejection of the Western model. The question is 
not so much whether such criticism is adequate, but why it has such a 
strong appeal in Russia. My intuition is that it has to do, mainly, with 
a different structure of political power. With, of course, some degree 
of generalization and simplification, Russia can be said to have a 
history in which people were always told what to do by those in a 
position to do so, whereas Europe has a history in which the focus has 
shifted from what people should do to how they should pursue their 
interests, settle their conflicts, or justify their orders and regulations
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(in a sense this is even true of Western philosophy, where the ques­
tion which position is true has given way, gradually but inevitably, 
to the question which positions are tenable). The difference between 
a predominance of laws that tell people how to settle their conflicts 
with each other and with the state, and a predominance of rule by 
decree [ukaz] that always has a concrete content, is obvious.
This has led to a focus, in Russia, on the question who is the 
right person to be in power, whereas in Europe discussions tend to 
focus rather on procedures. Of course, election campaigns in Western 
countries are strongly person-oriented, but this does not so much 
reflect a search for the right person. It rather has a motivating function 
because actual differences between canditates are relatively small, 
due precisely to the predominance of procedures: the more complex 
a democracy, the more ‘checks and balances’ are built in, the less 
important the person of the ‘leader’. Likewise, Europeans tend to 
turn political discussions into discussions about rules (highly typical 
examples are discussions about abortion or euthanasia), whereas 
Russians tend to turn them into discussions about norms [nravy]. 
These contrasts between form and content seem to rest upon differ­
ences in the structure and organization of society, especially of rela­
tions of power, and they also imply a difference between Russia and 
Europe with respect to the theories that serve to account for political 
action, and to legitimize a status quo.
This brings me to the second general theme: ideology. Ideology is a 
subject that is discussed intensively and in very different ways. To 
enter into that discussion is not my objective, and I shall limit myself 
to a brief exposition of my own conception at this point. Its value 
must then appear from its use in what follows; as to its theoretical 
background, I have employed ideas developed by George Kline, 
John Thompson, Leszek Kolakowski, and Louis Althusser (Kline 
1964, Thompson 1990, Kolakowski 1960, Althusser 1976).
Ideology, in my view, is a possible function of theories (’theory’ 
ranging from a single proposition to intricate theoretical constructs). 
Theories claim to be true, not of course in some naively realist sense, 
but in the sense of aiming at an understanding of some reality (this 
does not contradict my earlier statement about ‘tenability instead 
of truth’, rather it explains a basic tension in Western philosophy).
This asserted truth can function, whether used deliberately to that 
end or not, to motivate action or to legitimize a status quo. Theory 
and ideology do not belong to the same category, and therefore 
cannot be each other’s opposites. Whether or not a given theory 
does perform an ideological function does not depend on its being 
this or that theory, but on the situation in which it exists, and on its 
aptness to perform an ideological function given that situation. The 
truth-claim of theories is essential to their functioning ideologically, 
because it warrants the rightness of the action or status quo that 
is being justified. Ideology therefore does not necessarily exist at 
the expense of truth, as the Yugoslav Marxist Svetozar Stojanovic 
had it (Stojanovic 1987, 3), but it is at odds with critical thought 
questioning truth-claims.
Ideology, upon this conception, is a widespread and ‘natural’ 
phenomenon of any social order, i.e. of all empirically known social 
life. It fills in the space between, on the one hand, brutal, ‘naked’ 
execution of power, and, on the other, persuasive rational argument. 
Most or all execution of power is connected with ideological mecha­
nisms that compensate for force. The relationship between ideology 
and rational argument is more complicated. I opt for the following 
solution: any theory contains elements that can, in principle, be ques­
tioned. If a theory relies on principles or axioms, this is obvious; if 
it relies on empirical data, these can be opposed by other data, or 
their permanence can be questioned; if it relies, finally, on values 
or norms, these of course have to be shared, and if they are not 
they become ‘subjective’. Theories that function ideologically often 
contain more than one of these categories.
For example, when somebody says that it is right, and obligatory, 
to engage in ethnic cleansing of Bosnian villages, and legitimizes 
such cleansing by referring to a theory stating, among other things, 
that Serbian soil is holy ground, that Serbs are not only ethnically, 
but also morally superior to, e.g., Turks, since Serbs are defending 
Christianity against Islam, then, from a logical point of view, these 
statements function as axioms or absolute principles. He or she will 
further refer to innumerably many empirical facts that testify to 
Serbian superiority, and appeal to values like heroism and manhood. 
Such a theory can be questioned at many points. It is essential to its
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ideological efficacy, therefore, that i) it is not questioned, i.e. that 
alternatives are excluded, ii) practical conclusions ensue from it.
Or, to take a more innocent example: when I participate in the 
European elections, even though I am not fully convinced of the 
sense of doing so, I also engage in ideology. I motivate and legitimize 
my behavior by referring to a theory, partly mine, partly common, 
about the European Community and its democratic structure, con­
taining such vague principles as ‘the more opportunities to cast 
a ballot, the better it is -  so go and vote’, or by referring to cases 
where the political composition of the European Parliament did make 
a significant difference (omitting the cases where it did not), or in 
which the parliament, for better or for worse, successfully opposed 
the European Commission, and doubtful criteria such as what my 
late father’s opinion would have been.
If one subsumes both examples under the definition of ideology, 
then ideology is not only a universal, it is also not necessarily an ‘evil ’ 
phenomenon. Ideology is what makes society work, what makes 
people perform all kinds of actions without previously posing often 
unanswerable questions, and without using physical coercion. But 
it is also what makes people account for their sacking of Bosnian 
villages. In other words, it is not a matter of opposing the evil world 
of ideology to some utopian realm of transparent argumentation, 
but of differentiating and qualifying by acknowledging that, on one 
hand, one is caught up in ideology and, on the other hand, that one 
sometimes acts deliberately in its name. If one believes that argument 
is better than violence (which is not obvious either, but has itself to 
be argued for, an argument that cannot be conclusive in any strong 
sense of the term, and therefore requires ideological support, too), 
then ideology appears as ‘second best’, as something people need 
in order to make society run smoothly, but also as something that 
critical intellectuals never really feel comfortable with.
I personally regard critical analysis of ideological phenomena as 
a major task of intellectuals, and certainly for philosophers, but not 
as one that aims at a total deideologization or absolute absence of 
ideology, but as one that criticizes concrete cases of ideology. What 
is required to that end is freedom, both in the objective sense of 
freedom of expression and discussion, and in the subjective sense of 
daring to think radically and independently.
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Finally, it is important to stress that an ideological function may 
be performed by a theory, irrespective of the truth or falsity of that 
theory (if only because truth and falsity are rarely manifest), and also 
relatively irrespective of whether the people engaging in ideological 
mechanisms actually believe in, or adhere to the theories involved. 
At the same time, critical investigation of the truth-claims raised in 
an ideological context is harmful to smooth ideological function­
ing (which is why the powers ‘behind’ ideological mechanisms are 
always a potential danger to critical investigation). And credibility 
and sincere conviction do make a difference, too, but again not a 
crucial one.
This conception of ideology may seem to be at odds with another, 
widespread notion of ideology, namely that of a social and political 
doctrine or ‘world-view’. Ask people what ideology is, and they 
will mention communism, nationalism, fascism, fundamentalism, 
liberalism. From the perspective just expounded, these are examples 
of explicit, more or less stable, and more or less ‘ supervised’ theories, 
the primary function of which is an ideological one. This, by the way, 
explains why it makes no sense to speak about ‘the end of ideology’, 
even if major ideologies are being replaced by more subtle forms 
(although a case could be made that such forms as nationalism or 
fundamentalism are very much alive, and exemplify the ‘classical’ 
pattern).
Soviet Marxism-Leninism, always a prime example of ideology, 
appears in this conception as an extreme case, one that was, first, 
directly linked to established political power; second, carefully 
guarded and ‘creatively developed’, i.e., adapted to new circum­
stances; third, occupied a monopoly position; fourth, gradually 
became an exclusively legitimizing, not a motivating ideology; 
and, fifth, increasingly became a ritual affair with little conviction 
behind it (which is why such deep conviction had to be permanently 
asserted). Soviet ideology was an extreme case, finally, because it 
concealed its ideological nature by claiming to be an ideology, viz. 
a true and scientific one. A major effect of this was the offhand 
legitimate exclusion of any other ideology: alternative positions had 
to seek a legitimate place within it, which led to the peculiar pres­
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ence of liberals, social democrats, and national bolsheviks within a
communist party.
This lengthy exposition of the concept of ideology serves what 
follows in two respects: firstly, one must proceed very carefully when 
investigating Russian disputes about law, civil society, or civili­
zation, with their distinct but not opposing ideological functions 
and theoretical merits; secondly, one must be particulary careful 
with respect to the use of the very word ‘ideology’. The specifically 
Soviet notion of ideology -  an extreme one in my view -  has left 
deep traces in the minds of those who somehow participated within 
it and of those who opposed it.
RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL IDEOLOGY
During the years of perestrojka and glasnost’ (1986-90), the 
lamentable state of jurisdiction and human rights in the USSR 
became a subject of public debate. A lively discussion took place 
about themes that belong to philosophy of law, and in which both 
jurists and philosophers took part (Frolov 1988, Nersesjanc 1988). 
The political stakes in this debate were clear: the establishment of a 
Rechtsstaat, with or without the achievements of 70 years of Soviet 
rule. As this discussion now belongs to the past, I shall pass over 
much of its detail and focus on essentials.1
Obviously, criticism was aimed first of all at all kinds of 
subordination of citizens to the state. Thus, for example, Tatjana 
Znamenskaja and Ol’ga RazbaS criticized the ‘fundamental tenet 
about the inseparability of the rights and obligations of citizens,’ e.g., 
the immediate link between the right to labour and the obligation to 
work, which turns the citizen into an object instead of a subject of 
law (Znamenskaja &c 1988, 37f; Konstitucija 1988, art. 40).2 Also, 
a strong call was made for zakonnost’ [legality]: if any law can be 
cancelled by a decree [ukaz] or an order [prikaz] from above, the 
result is a cynic, not a citizen. One of the dissidents’ demands had 
always been that the Soviet government should stick to its own laws.3 
This issue originated in the Marxist-Leninist conception of law as an 
instrument of the ruling class, an idea that was fully applied in the 
USSR: if law is a mere means, not a goal, there is no particular 
reason to employ it when there are more effective alternatives.
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The foundations of Soviet legal theory were laid in the late 1930s, 
more precisely in 1938, with, according to different sources, A.Ja. 
VySinskij as the major culprit (Mamut 1989,12, Kruglyj stol 1990, 
14). Within the framework of this theory, right was defined as a 
“system of general compulsory norms of conduct. . . ,  which express 
the free will of the ruling class (or of society as a whole, if the 
phenomenon of class-society has been succesfully lifted); the state 
elaborates these norms and lays them down, the state also ensures 
their execution” (Mamut 1989, ibid.). This total identification of 
right with actual law went hand in hand with the subordination of 
the citizen to the state, of the individual to the collective: “The ideas 
of a defense of the honour and dignity of the person, of a protection 
of the rights and liberties of the citizens disappeared completely from 
the ‘official’ legal theory and practice of those days” (Kudrjavcev 
&c 1988, 47). Nor was this identification corrected in later years: 
Leonid Mamut quotes a passage similar to the one quoted above 
from a 1988 textbook in Legal Theory for future jurists (Mamut 
1989,13; cf. Nersesjanc 1988,30, Nersesjanc 1989,10, and Osnovy 
...1982 ,271).
More theoretical discussions were grouped around the concept of 
a ‘socialist Rechtsstaat’ [socialisticeskoe pravovoe gosudarstvo]. 
The mobilization of the ‘human factor’ [Seloveceskij faktor] was 
recognized as a precondition for a successful perestrojka (van der 
Zweerde 1992), and required a juridical foundation to ensure that 
those participating in the process of transformation would not later 
be punished (Solov’ev 1989, 75; Zaslavskaja 1986). The fact that 
a Rechtsstaat formed part of the CPSU program as a means to 
arrive at a ‘human democratic socialism ’ (Kudrjavcev &c 1990, 4; 
Materialy 1990, 77 80) enabled jurists, philosophers and others to 
address issues that belonged to philosophy of law (Nersesjanc 1988, 
1; Nersesjanc 1989,3, Kudrjavcev &c 1990,6f, 11; Solov’ev 1989, 
75), a philosophical discipline that had not existed in Soviet times.4
Connected with this discussion was the rehabilitation both 
of bourgeois theorists like Montesquieu (Artamonovl990; also 
Nersesjanc 1989,3-7; Solov’ëv 1989,63-73) and the Russian liberal 
legal philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries like Bogdan Aleksandrovic Kistjakovskij (1868-1920),
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who stressed the importance of rule of law, insufficiently 
acknowledged by the Russian intelligencija (Copleston 1988, 2 If; 
Kistjakovskij 1990; Kistjakovskij 1991; Skakun 1990; SamSurin 
1990; Nersesjanc 1989,3; Walicki 1992).
A major figure in this discussion was the jurist Vladik Sumbatovic 
Nersesjanc (b. 1938), to whom is ascribed the réintroduction of the 
distinction between right [pravo, ius] and law [zakon, lex] in a book, 
published in 1983, when there was no visible sign of perestrojka 
yet.5 This distinction is essential, because it is presupposed in any 
judgment of whether a given law is right or not:
. . .  a law (in the broad sense of the term, including all officially recognized norms 
and sources of prevailing right) both can and can not correspond to right (such is 
a ‘rightful law’ \pravovoj zakon]), and can also diverge from it as in the case of a 
mistake by the legislator or in cases of abuse of the legal form (Kruglyj stol 1990, 
21; Nersesjanc 1988,21).
Nersesjanc’ chief source of inspiration is Hegel, whom he rightly 
defends against accusations of being an apologist of Prussian 
monarchy and a trailblazer of totalitarianism:
Hegel’s state, as a moral unity [nravstvennoe celoe], not only disposes of an 
absolute right with Tespect to its component parts, but is itself right in its developed 
totality, too; it therefore is a Rechtsstaat, not only as a wish and an ideal, but as 
idea and reality [dejstvitel’nost'] (Nersesjanc 1989,6).6
Another prominent participant in the discussion, the philosopher 
Erikh Jur’evic Solov’ëv (b. 1934), is known especially for his 
unqualified emphasis on the central place occupied by the notion 
of the human person [licnost’].7 His contribution to the theme of 
Rechtsstaat and human rights is in line with this licnost’ -problematic: 
his point of departure is the relation between individual (citizen) and 
collective (society, state), and his main source of inspiration is Kant 
(Solov’ev 1989, 67, and idem, Kruglyj stol 1990,4f.). By opposing 
the idea that society is “some kind of “super-organism” ” rather than 
“the rich variety of individualized human beings” (Solov’ëv, 1988, 
50), as well as the idea, alien to Marx and Engels, that history is 
“some separate personality, using man as a means to achieve its own 
goals” (op.cit., 51), Solov’ëv arrived at a conception of the person 
as the natural subject of unalienable rights (Solov ’ ëv, Kruglyj stol 
1990,6).
Both Solov’ëv and Nersesjanc thus stressed the distinction 
between law and right, thereby opposing current Soviet legalism.
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However, in the case of Nersesjanc the final realization of right is 
the Rechtsstaat, whereas for Solov’ev state and individual remain 
separate entities, standing in a balanced relation to each other in civil 
society. It is no surprise, in the light of recent Soviet history, that in 
a country with an age-long tradition of absolute state power, during 
which rights and freedom were a gift rather than a right (Kudrjavcev 
&c 1990, 10), stress is on the protection of individual rights against 
state power by imposing limits on the latter (Znamenskaja &c 1988), 
and on the need to ‘elevate the citizen to the position of equal partner 
of the state and its organs’ (Kudrjavcev &c 1990, 8).
One of the distinctively new elements in the discussion was the rejec­
tion of the standard Marxist thesis of the class nature of bourgeois 
law (Koval’zon, Kruglyj stol 1990, 28). Moreover, bourgeois law, 
which came into existence in the period of rising capitalism, was her­
alded as an “everlasting democratic achievement” (Solov’ev 1989, 
73; cf. Koval’zon, Kruglyj stol 1990, 28). Several authors argued 
that the conception and realization of civil society and Rechtsstaat 
could be linked historically to the rise of the third, middle estate 
[tretij sloj]. This already points to the paradoxical situation in the 
USSR: would it be possible to create a Rechtsstaat when the natural 
basis of that state is absent, and should come into existence within 
it?
As to the content of the concept of a Rechtsstaat there was little 
discussion. Nersesjanc gave a ‘minimal definition’: “the supremacy 
[verkhovenstvo] of law, the effectiveness of the rights and liberties of 
individuals, the organization and functioning of state power accord­
ing to the principle of the separation of powers” (Nersesjanc 1989, 
7; cf. Mamut 1989,14). Elaborating somewhat, we can say that most 
authors agreed with Nersesjanc on a set of crucial points, which were 
by no means obvious in the Soviet or post-Soviet contexts:
i. a first condition is that the laws be effective: “the coming-to-be 
of a Rechtsstaat. . .  is nothing but the transition from an admin­
istration of society by means of the directives of a bureaucratic 
machinery . . .  to rule exclusively on the basis of laws in the 
immediate and precise meaning of the word” (Vengerov 1990, 
50,60; cf. Nersesjanc 1989,7, Zor’kin 1990,98, Kudrjavcev &c 
1988,44, 49);
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ii. legality, however, is a necessary, not a sufficient condition, since 
even rule by presidential decree can be fully legal (Nersesjanc
1989,12). In order for legality to be rightful legality [pravovaja 
zakonnost’] other conditions must be met:
• the constitution must be preceded by a declaration of human 
rights and liberties [deklaracija prav i svobod celoveka] 
(Kudrjavcev See 1990,9-11, Znamenskaja &c 1988,45);
• the primacy of the first-generation human rights (political, 
civil rights) over those of the second generation (economic, 
social and cultural rights) must be recognized (Kudrjavcev
& cl990,9);
• there has to be effective control and supervision of the 
execution of laws by the state (Znamenskaja &c, 46; cf. 
Kudrjavcev &c 1988,54, Zor’kin 1990);
• the state itself must be subordinated to the law as an absolute 
condition of the ‘reality of individuals’ rights and liberties’ 
(Nersesjanc 1989,7; cf. Kudrjavcev &c 1988,52);
• finally, there must be a separation of powers [razdelenie 
vlastej] into legislative, executive, and judicial (Zor’kin 
1990, 99f, Nersesjanc 1989, 7), a Trias politica that was 
advocated by the CPSU, too (Materialy 1990,89);
iii. in the third place, a necessary condition for a Rechtsstaat is the 
development of a socio-economic foundation, summarized in 
the concept of civil society [grazdanskoe obSdestvo] (Nersesjanc 
1989,12 e.a.), a society that can only come into existence at the 
expense of state power.
Although all participants in the discussion acknowledged that for 
the coming-to-be of a civil society two conditions must be realized, 
namely a market economy and individual freedom, there was, at this 
point, a contrast between, on the one hand, an ‘economist optimism’ 
(or scepticism with respect to it), and on the other hand the ‘statism’ 
of someone like Nersesjanc. Thus Kudrjavcev and LukaSeva stated 
that “socialism creates entirely new economic, social and political 
conditions, under which the formation of a.Rechtsstaat is inextricably 
connected with the democratization of all societal life, with the 
realization of genuine popular power” (Kudrjavcev &c 1988, 45f), 
i.e. primarily with a transformation of government and state given a
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socio-economic basis. Nersesjanc stressed that “without a free person 
that is protected by law it is impossible to arrive at the development 
o f  a civil society that could be the basis of a Rechtsstaat” (Nersesjanc
1989,12), but he laid equal stress on the fact that is must be the just 
sta te  that incarnates freedom (Nersesjanc, Kruglyj stol 1990, 14f), 
a  statement that evoked the scepticism of those who saw the free 
individual primarily as a counterbalance for state power:
O n the one hand, personal freedom corresponded to the ethics of free market and 
competition, on the other hand it became a pillar of civil society, the latter acting 
a s  a compensation for state power. (. . . )  In this way, the autonomy of the person 
vis-à-vis the state is anecessary condition for civil society (Znamenskaja &c 1988,
46f).
Broadly speaking, an antithesis manifested itself between a ‘Marxist- 
Hegelian’ position that stresses the historical conditions for a 
Rechtsstaat, e.g. the fact that it is only now that the USSR is a 
“ sufficiently highly civilized society” (Kudrjavcev &c 1988, 47), 
and a ‘Kantian’ position that advocates the natural and eternal char­
acter of individual human rights.
Despite these differences, individual autonomy and market economy 
were generally regarded as pillars of civil society. However, citi­
zens are not automatically autonomous individuals. More precisely, 
subjects of a state, however legal it may be, are not automatically 
citizens, they also must be able to and have the courage to act that 
way. The specific problem of the late Soviet and post-Soviet situation 
in this respect appears in full if one looks at the subjective and inter- 
subjective side, comprising legal consciousness, legal culture, and 
legal ideology [pravovaja ideologija]. The most vulnerable spot in 
the development of a Rechtsstaat in Russia is probably the absence, 
among broad layers of the population, including the intelligencija, 
o f  consciousness of rights, of knowledge of and trust in actual law, 
o f  respect for it rather than fear. The presence of traditions that were 
formed by ages of suppression and arbitrariness was recognized as 
a  problem of the first order by, among others, Znamenskaja and 
RazbaS, who wrote in 1988:
The political culture of a nation is the product of a protracted spiritual development. 
In the West, the ideas of humanism, personal freedom, and self-esteem of the 
individual found support in religion and in the very nature of the capitalist mode 
o f  production, whereas our national democratic traditions have developed under
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different conditions. Orthodox religion with its spirit of conciliarity [sobornost’], 
i.e. collectivism, the communal form of agriculture [obscinoe vedenie khozjajstva], 
and finally feudal law, the moral consequences of which we have not overcome 
to the present day, not to mention more recent periods of personality cult and 
stagnation -  all this contributed to the development of totally different visions of 
man and of his position vis-à-vis the state (Znamenskaja &c 1988,50f).
And yet, according to Zor’kin, it is these powerful traditions that 
have to be counteracted in order to establish a civil society, i.e. a 
society of citizens who are well aware of their rights:
It is impossible to fight violation of justice, including totalitarianism,.. .  unless 
the inner world of man revolts against it, unless broad layers of society realize 
that it is an evil, and adopt an active attitude that is oriented towards overcoming 
it (Zor’kin,Kruglyj stol 1990,23).
Law must be cultivated, a legal culture must be brought into being: 
respect for the law, knowledge of it, “an attitude towards law as 
towards an everlasting social value, without which the values that 
pertain to the socialist system -  social justice, humanism, freedom, 
equality, glasnost’, collectivism, other democratic ideals and princi­
ples -  cannot establish themselves” (Kopejcikov &c 1990, 32, 28; 
cf. Kudrjavcev &c 1990,7).
The need to stimulate and ground a culture of law implies a 
‘re-education’ of the citizenry, esp. of civil servants, “in a spirit of 
recognition of the supremacy of the law, of the unconditional priority 
of justice and legality,” which requires the introduction of “a new 
moral-legal category...  that of the political reputation of a statesman 
and party-official” (Balgaj 1989, 39). If ‘politician’ is a profession, 
it is evident that one of Russia’s many deficits today is a shortage 
of professional politicians (Meiuev, Kruglyj stol 1990,10). Further, 
the mere fact that liberal and humanist notions are prominent in 
theoretical discussions does not imply that “these new values will 
quickly and easily take root in the ideological consciousness of 
society” (Znamenskaja &c 1988, 49).
The subject of legal consciousness and culture leads to a deli­
cate point: the idea of ‘legal ideology’ [pravovaja ideologija]. On 
the basis of a conception of ideology as a more or less coherent 
set of propositions (a ‘theory’), that organizes the commitment and 
activities of social groups and/or legitimizes some status quo result­
ing from such activity, and which fulfills this function in relative 
independence of the truth or falsity of those propositions,8 the idea
of a ‘legal ideology’ is not at all absurd. It would take the form of a 
coherent set of assertions functioning as a motivating and legitimiz­
ing factor, independently of the truth-value of these assertions, i.e. 
irrespective of the possibility of founding them in any conclusive 
manner. Nor is the idea of a positive ideological function of philos­
ophy, viz. as an attempt theoretically to underpin a notion such as 
the inalienability of human rights based on human nature, deprived 
of meaning.
The recognition of the exigency to establish a market-economy as a 
sine qua non of civil society leads to the central difficulty of the entire 
discussion: is the political objective to humanize and democratize 
socialism, i.e. the striving for a socialist Rechtsstaat, compatible with 
the necessarily spontaneous, natural, and presumably ‘wild’, devel­
opment of a market economy? Moreover, what would be socialist 
about such a Rechtsstaat? On this point, Solov’ev and Nersesjanc, 
to take two token positions, gave clearly differing answers.
According to Solov’ev, the scope of individual rights is an impor­
tant parameter of social progress (Solov’ev 1989,79): a legal system 
that recognizes the so-called social human rights (the right to labor, 
leisure, education, medical care), is more developed and more demo­
cratic than one that merely recognizes classical, political human 
rights. From this perspective, the Soviet system appears upside 
down: it prided itself on its guarantee of economic and social rights 
(Vengerov 1990,51), whereas classical human rights not only came 
in second, but were recognized only conditionally at that.9
According to Nersesjanc, in line with his ‘minimal definition’ 
of socialism (Nersesjanc1990, 47), the difference between a non­
socialist and a socialist Rechtsstaat consists of the presence or 
absence of private ownership of the means of production. But, how­
ever obvious this may seem, it merely shifts the problem to the 
question of a ‘ socialist market economy ’.
The fundamental problem behind this discussion and the explana­
tion of its apparent sterility is the problem of the spontaneity, or 
Naturwüchsigkeit, of historical development. The genesis of civil 
society in Europe and other parts of the world was a very complicated 
process with a momentum of its own, not projected or planned by 
any persons or institutions. In Russia, however, this same process
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would have to be the aim of a political programme, one that is clear, 
convincing, and attractive in every respect. In a way, Russian history 
seems to be repeating itself: towards the end of the 19th century, the 
Russian intelligencija faced the question, perceived as highly urgent 
at the time, whether or not Russia had to go through a capitalist 
and bourgeois stage of development in order to become a social­
ist society, and whether or not the government should introduce or 
stimulate capitalism for that reason.10 Towards the end of the 20th 
century, the question reads thus: should a market economy be intro­
duced or stimulated in order to create a civil society as the natural
basis of a Rechtsstaat!
The existence of contemporary Western society, as well as the 
knowledge of the historical development of civil society, may appear 
as an advantage for post-Soviet theoreticians and politicians. In 
point of fact, however, it rather is a disadvantage, for every hypo­
thetical factor, every supposedly critical moment in that process, 
inevitably becomes the object of choice and takes the form of a 
political option. If a free market economy must be established, then 
how quickly should that process take place, with which extent of 
political freedom, with which acceptable degree of social tension? 
Clearly, these are important and recurring political issues in Western 
society, too, but there they emerge against the background of an 
already established market economy and within the framework of a 
functioning democracy, which renders all political options corrective 
rather than constitutive.
The problem at stake here was formulated in all clarity by 
Kudrjavcev and LukaSeva:
Without economic freedom it is difficult to acquire political freedom, for the 
‘deprivatization’ [ogosudarstvlenie] of property means the destruction of civil 
society and its institutions. ( . . . )  Human rights must develop in a natural way 
and on a sound economic basis [italics mine, EvdZ], in which the citizen acts not 
as an executor, alienated from property, of orders and commands . . . ,  but as a 
proprietor [khozjain], who realizes his interests and needs in free exchange with 
other participants in economic processes. This is an absolute condition, not only 
to secure human rights, but also for the formation of a Rechtsstaat. (Kudrjavcev
&c 1990,5).
With respect to ‘legal ideology’, this problem is redoubled: if one 
is convinced that legal consciousness and legal culture are crucial 
factors in the formation of civil society and Rechtsstaat, and if one 
assumes (and hopes!) that theoretical positions may perform, in
CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGY: A MATTER OF FREEDOM 185
one way or another, an ideological function in the sense that they 
support or stimulate the development of civil autonomy vis-à-vis the 
state, then the theoretical question ‘how does a civil society come 
about?’ gets entangled with the practical question ‘which theoretical 
position or perspective should one adopt in order to further that 
development? ’
So, even if the ideas of a socialist market and of a socialist 
Recktsstaat are dropped, as they were in subsequent years, the 
problem still remains: the desired development is not something 
to achieve, but something that has to be allowed to happen. The 
choice thus is that between allowing or hindering a process, the 
consequences of which cannot be foreseen, making it impossible to 
determine whether, to use an expression of Milton Fisk, it “might 
not lead to a Mexican disaster rather than to a US success” (Fisk 
1991,48).
The choice of theoretical positions by Russian intellectuals at 
this stage of late Soviet history was determined also by the social 
position of the theoreticians themselves. Apart from its theoretical 
importance Nersesjanc’ ètatizm also has an emotional value, and 
hence a practical effect that differs from that of the individualism 
and ‘moralism’ of someone like Solov’ev. The manifest preference 
for a ‘Kantian’ rather than a ‘Hegelian’ position, and for a self- 
confident and militant humanism,11 seem to be natural reactions of 
theoreticians who are themselves citizens, too.
However understandable and sympathetic this ‘spontaneous 
humanism’ may be, it is not only theoretically problematic in the 
era of post-humanism and post-modernism, it also, on a practical 
level, risks subordinating - this time voluntarily - theoretical values 
to their hoped for practical effect. An ideological function of 
philosophy is not an evil per se, but it becomes a relative evil inso­
far as it excludes independent, non-committed research. Aleksandr 
Sergeevic Panarin (b. 1940) was right in this respect when he made 
a plea for the autonomy of science vis-à-vis state and party (one 
may skip the party today), as well as for an independent position of 
philosophy and the social sciences vis-à-vis civil society (Panarin
1990,129f, 134).
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The discussion itself has come to an end, at least among philoso­
phers. This, however, does not mean that it was pointless: it reflected 
the objective and structural problems of late Soviet society. While 
philosophy had previously been a ‘symptom’ of Soviet reality in the 
first place, it now proved to be its ‘ traumatic consciousness’. This was 
a first, important step towards an autonomous position of philosophy 
within society. The next step would have to be a transition to a critical 
‘diagnosis’ of social and political reality, including the reality of 
philosophy itself, a transition that is still far from completed.12 The 
final and decisive step, ‘therapeutic’ in an indirect manner, will come 
about when philosophy claims its own ‘civil rights’, no longer caring 
about its positive contribution to civil society and eo ipso becoming 
part of it.
The generally abstract nature of the discussion on rule of law 
and human rights in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia seems to 
justify the conclusion that such discussions, though very important 
for the development of political and legal consciousness among the 
participants, have very little direct effect. The well-known Georgian 
philosopher Merab Konstantinovic MamardaSvili (1930-1990) hit 
the nail on the head when he suggested:
We ought to start doing small and slow things, instead of fighting all-out for, 
say, Georgia’s independence. (...) We have to start at a local level. Set up a
school tomorrow__ Start breaking through those vertical structures which, almost
mathematically, all end in Moscow.... ’13
It remains to be seen whether the legal conceptions of Russian 
philosophers and other intellectuals, sensitized by their experience 
with the Soviet system, can compensate for the weakly developed 
legal consciousness of large parts of the Russian population. The 
average citizen still seems to regard himself as an object rather than 
a subject of law, a potential victim of the state rather than a relatively 
autonomous member of a civil society (Znamenskaja &c 1988,51). 
When I presented my account of the above discussion to an audi­
ence of Russian philosophy teachers, their most forceful reaction 
was: “Rule of law and civil society are wonderful things, but not 
for us; what we need is a harsh dictatorship that obliges the poor 
to remain poor so long as necessary.” If Anatolij Vengerov was 
right that the establishment of a Rechtsstaat presupposes the demo­
lition, not the perfection, touching up, or cosmetic repair of the state
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machinery (Vengerov 1990,62), then it is evident that this machinery 
will have to demolish itself to begin with. Not only did this process 
of self-destruction not take place,14 it also is at odds with the call for 
a powerful state to protect the many victims of ‘wild capitalism’.
HISTORY REGAINED? RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO FUKUYAMA
This last remark, by one of the “thousands of instructors and theoreti­
cians in scientific communism (who) know nothing but the dogmas 
of mythologized Marxism, and (who) are only capable of propa­
gating these dogmas” (Nikiforov 1990,127), points the way to my 
second topic. A few years ago, when the walls were tumbling in 
East Europe, democracy was making its way in Latin America, and 
market economy was spreading in Asia, the surface of Western public 
opinion was rippled by Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’, first 
the article in the semi-official National Interest (summer 1989), then, 
in 1992, the book with the even more provocative title The End of 
History and the Last Man. Fukuyama’s main source of inspiration 
was Hegel’s philosophy of history, mediated through the French 
Hegel-scholar and diplomat Alexandre Kojkve.
Briefly, Fukuyama’s argument runs as follows. Human history 
has been marked by a struggle between different ways of organizing 
society, including economy and politics. This has not only been a 
struggle of economic or political forces but also, and even primarily, 
a struggle of ideas and ideologies. The intrinsic goal of this history 
is freedom, regarded as the capacity of humans to be free, i.e. 
self-determining (in opposition to nature’s determination), and to 
organize their social life in such a way as to realize that freedom. 
According to Fukuyama, the opposition between Communism and 
Democracy was not only a relative opposition, since in the end the 
‘alternative’ systems served democratization in backward countries 
(Fukuyama 1992, 67),15 it was also the last stage in a historical 
struggle. The breakdown of the Soviet system corresponds histori­
cally with the global victory of market economy-cum-liberal 
democracy. The main rival ideology, Marxism-Leninism, has been 
defeated, and there is only one serious candidate for human social 
order left. In this sense, then, history has come to an end, as there 
will never be a superior system. The struggle of ideas has ended,
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history now merely becoming the process of reality moving toward 
the realization of the only remaining idea.
Fukuyama’s position was quickly recognized, by Western intel­
lectuals, as profoundly ideological itself, if not direct US government 
propaganda. Perhaps it was discarded even too quickly and easily. In 
the first place, Fukuyama’s stance does reflect the general position of 
Western governments and citizens - we do look at Myanmar (Burma) 
with the idea that they are ‘not yet’ where we have ‘already’ arrived 
(Fukuyama 1995, 32) - and thus presents an important case for an 
analysis of Western ‘social consciousness’. In the second place, the 
fact that Fukuyama’s theory performs an ideological function does 
not necessarily affect the theory itself: it may still entail valuable 
insights, it may be open to refinement, and it may, last but not least, 
be true. I cannot think of any a priori reason why the mere fact that 
a theory suits some political practice would discredit that theory, or 
confirm it for that matter.
It is clear that from a Western perspective the late USSR presented 
a major test-case for Fukuyama’s argument, and the failure of subse­
quent Soviet and Russian governments to make a smooth transition 
to market economy and liberal democracy can easily be thought 
to refute Fukuyama’s position, or at least make it problematic. To 
be sure, this failure does not affect the core of the Hegel-Koj&ve- 
Fukuyama thesis: it merely implies that the end of history has not 
yet definitively come about world-wide, not that this end itself is 
different from what they claim it is.16
From a Russian perspective things look quite different, for the 
issue immediately turns into the age-old debate about whether Russia 
should follow the Western way or find its own road, linked to some 
kind of svoeobrazie or rossijnost’. A translation of Fukuyama’s 
article appeared 1990 in Voprosy filosofii, with an interesting com­
mentary by Jurij Aleksandrovic ZamoSkin (1927-1993).17 During 
the perestrojka-QrsL and after, a strong trend in the USSR/CIS/Russia 
held that the transition to a market economy should be made as 
quickly as possible, as is testified by the 1992 dialogue in Put’ by 
Fukuyama and the political scientist and Yeltsin-advisor Andranik 
Migranjan. The latter is an advocate of an authoritarian transition 
from totalitarianism to democracy (Fukuyama &c 1992, 234), and 
showed himself to be more radical and optimistic than Fukuyama,
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who pointed out that market economy and democracy must develop 
‘from below’, given the evident risks of authoritarianism:
If you create a strong state in order to destroy the old state, who will give you a 
guarantee that the new state will serve democratic goals? Today you try to use that 
state in order to create a chance for free economic activity to spread. But while 
you are attaining that goal, you create a new apparatus. And at the head of that 
apparatus a totally different person may turn up. And that will present a greater 
threat to democracy than any more decentralized system, when power is based on 
an equilibrium between different institutions (Fukuyama &c 1992,238).
In connection with the vehement debate over the fate of Marxism 
in Russia, Vadim Michajlovic Mefcuev (b. 1933) added a cultural 
element to this historiosophical argument. He stated that the socialist 
experiment in Russia had been a failure from the outset, due how­
ever not to socialism or Marxism, but to Russia’s immaturity: ‘The 
experience with the development in our country after the October 
revolution justifies misgivings about the possibility of socialist 
reforms in a pre-civilized or early-civilized stage of development 
of society, or, as we used to write, “passing by capitalism [minuja 
kapitalizm].”is Meiuev took the next step, when he included Marx­
ism in the global process of civilization:
... without the Marxist or, more generally, the social-democratic and communist 
idea, capitalism would not have become what it is today. Like any dynamic and 
developing system, civilization absorbs a moment of negation and critique into its 
very development.... With respect to it [to civilization, EvdZ], Marxism fulfills 
its historical task by furthering its democratization and humanization___’19
This may well be true with respect to Western society, but then one 
should remember that in the West socialism existed, and continues 
to exist, within the framework of civil society and liberal democracy, 
whereas in Russia these were annihilated, if they ever were alive.
Nersesjanc went one more step further and explicitly opposed 
Fukuyama (Nersesjanc 1993,13) with his position that there can be 
no return to capitalism, because that would mean to run against the 
objective course of history. Despite all terror and tragedy, socialism 
has fulfilled its historic mission, viz., the abolition of private owner­
ship of the means of production. Being the negation of capitalism, 
socialism has negated, along with private property, bourgeois law 
with its merely formal equality of all in favor of real equality. Today, 
the negation of this negation must be accomplished, in the sense of 
a restoration of formal equality before the law without a restoration
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of private property, sublating both to a higher level by adding what 
Nersesjanc calls ‘civil property’, a general right of every citizen to 
an equal share in ‘desocialized’ socialist property; on top of that 
basic property everybody may enrich himself according to his abili­
ties and possibilities (Nersesjanc 1990, 48ff)> This, he holds, would 
not only be more just than the present situation, in which the state 
overnight has turned itself into a major proprietor by treating socialist 
property as state property, it would also be the basis for progress 
and freedom, i.e. for human civilization as such. Capitalism should 
follow this path, too, but it can do so ‘passing by socialism [minuja 
socializm] ’, since “the rough labor of history has already been done” 
(Nersesjanc 1993, 12). The new social formation, post-socialist as 
well as post-capitalist, is called ‘civilism’ [civilizm] by Nersesjanc 
(Nersesjanc 1990,56, and idem 1993, passim).
Clearly, the development of uncontrolled capitalism in Russia has 
already nullified the practical chances for any such socialist or civilist 
legal order, but these notions retain their importance as they reflect 
the typically post-Soviet outlook of many intellectuals. Moreover, 
the fact that Russia has definitely not become the kind of liberal 
democracy-cum-free market economy orthodox Fukuyamians might 
dream about, seems to justify the expectation that these or similar 
conceptions will be put on the agenda again in the near future.
Nersesjanc’ position fits into the basically Hegelian scheme, also 
adopted by Marx and by Fukuyama, even if they give it a different 
content. Several points can be made. One could ‘accuse’ Nersesjanc 
of filling the traditional scheme of historical materialism with a new 
content, the form being retained while the matter is replaced; but 
one could also agree with Nersesjanc that a transition to a Western 
model is not automatically Russia’s only or even best choice, and one 
might praise him for at least suggesting a way out of the dilemma­
like choice between dikij kapitalizm and one or the other variety of 
‘Russkaja ideja’.
The point I want to stress, however, is that Fukuyama is right with 
his insistance, against Migranjan, on the fact that the development 
of a market economy, a civil society, and a democratic political 
order must take place primarily from below, and that all that can be 
done from above is the establishment of a set of necessary, but not 
sufficient conditions that allow for these developments to take place:
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a legal system, public order, a state monopoly on violence. It is a 
matter of creating a place where things may happen, i.e. a matter of 
negative freedom (absence of barriers). A further necessary condition 
is the capacity of individuals or groups within society to act as free 
citizens, to have the confidence that their rights will be respected, 
that judges will be neutral, and that it will make sense to call upon 
the legal system instead of turning to organized crime when their 
partner in business is not willing to pay. In Russia today, neither 
of these conditions seems to be fully realized, and the crux of the 
matter is to be found on the subjective level, in the will to act as free 
individual human beings, helped in this by a legal consciousness and 
legal ideology.
This in turn has very much to do with the distinction I made, at the 
outset of this paper, between form and matter. Soviet ideology and 
the Soviet legal system were ‘material’ in nature: they told people 
what to think and what to do. The ideology and legal system of a 
civil society, by contrast, are formal rather than material: they tell 
people how to deal with conflicting ideas and interests, and how to 
behave in politics and economy. Whatever road Russia will take, 
this difference seems to be of critical importance. The essence of 
pluralism is not that there are many positions, nor that there should 
be, nor even that they have to be tolerated at all costs, but that a 
plurality of positions or interests is legitimate (even if there actually 
is only one position), because there is a formal rule that says that 
any position or interest is legitimate (precautions regarding criminal 
acts or attempts to undermine the legal order itself left aside).
And this equally applies to ideology. The general ideology of 
Western society is pluralist, particular positions like liberalism, 
social democracy, Christian democracy, and even fascism, but also 
ecologism, feminism, anthroposophy, or consumerism having their 
legitimate place within that order. In other words: this ideology is 
formal, too. More precisely, there exists a general, formal ideology, 
based on the idea of pluralism as a value in itself (or at least as the 
lesser evil) that explicitly leaves room for an unlimited variety of 
‘ideologies’, i.e. of theories that function ideologically in motivating 
people in what they do or help them account for what they have done, 
or again enable them to legitimize a status quo. Ideas do motivate 
people in this situation, but they can be very different in nature.
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CIVILIZATION AND IDEOLOGY
This leads to a third and last topic, the attempt by Nelli Vasil’evna 
MotroSilova (b. 1934) to let certain ideas work in the present situa­
tion in Russia, i.e. in my terminology, to make philosophical ideas 
perform a positive ideological function. Motro§ilova was one of 
the leading Soviet historians of philosophy, and today is one of 
Russia’s leading philosophers (if that notion still applies at all), who 
has done much for the revival of philosophical culture. Western 
readers were familiar with her work mainly through a collection of 
articles on the history of Western philosophy, selected and edited 
by MotroSilova, that appeared in Germany in 1986, and that was 
reviewed favorably.20 To the small group of Western ‘philosophical 
sovietologists’ who more or less systematically kept up with Soviet 
philosophical literature in the original, she was further known as the 
author of the only adequate Soviet study on phenomenology for a 
long time,21 and of an unorthodox study on Hegel.22
Like Solov’ev and MamardaSvili, MotroSilova is member of the 
generation of the 1960s - the sestidesjatniki - who, having received 
their philosophical training during the relatively liberal period of 
‘thaw’, tried to preserve a certain level of philosophical culture 
within institutionalized and ideologized Soviet philosophy.23 Under 
Soviet circumstances, to be a historian of philosophy was one of the 
few possible ways to be a philosopher. In more recent publications, 
MotroSilova appears no longer primarily as a historian of philosophy, 
but as a historically oriented philosopher who turns to the present 
problems of Russia. Her aim is not to analyze the actual situation in 
Russia - a philosophical Aktualitatsanalyse - but to act upon that 
situation through the elaboration and ‘propaganda’ of the idea of 
civilization. Her objective is to counteract the threatening decline 
of human civilization on a world-wide scale (Motrolilova 1991, 3), 
and to bring Russia back to the mainstream of that civilization after 
its Soviet period (12).
There is remarkable continuity in MotroSilova’s work: a straight 
line runs from her investigations into 16th and 17th century anthro­
pological conceptions,24 through her study of the social-historical 
roots of classical German philosophy, to the theme of humanism 
and civilization in her more recent work. The heart of this line is 
to be found, I think, in the profound and reflected conviction that
philosophy is part of historical reality (MotroSilova 1991, 8f.). It is 
formed and influenced by it, but not in a passive way: it is a factor 
in the historical process, i.e., in the further development of society 
and civilization. This conviction determines not only the theoretical 
approach present in MotroSilova’s work, but also the goal of her 
theoretical practice. In other words: certain theoretical positions are 
consciously turned into action by someone who knows which role 
these positions have played in a historical development that Russia 
should urgently hang on to. Taking up the the “moral responsibility 
of a historian of philosophy” (MotroSilova 1991, 5), MotroSilova 
tries to do herself what she has seen, in her historical studies, others 
engaging in, and seeks to deploy the results of her research into the 
history of philosophy to help resolve Russia’s ‘lack of civilization’:
... my choice is to present to the reader a history of philosophy centred around 
... the problem of problems: the laborious coming-to-be of Civilized Man, and, 
consequently, around the ideas of philosophers who made a particular contribution 
to the birth, development and defence of universal humanistic values (MotroSilova
1990, 191f).
This approach would be one way to civilize
our Homeland, a country of the most elevated spiritual culture, of very rich and 
pluriform traditions, enormous creative potentials, and in that respect a civilized 
country, [which] in other respects lags more and more behind contemporary stan­
dards and the high level of civilized being attained already (MotroSilova 1990, 
190).
In 1990, Motro§ilova investigated the ways in which classical 
German philosophy was conditioned by its epoch as well as the 
ways in which that philosophy, by virtue of its understanding of how 
it was related to its epoch, was one of the factors in making that 
epoch. Investigating the history of philosophy, she tried to develop 
a theory of the “general mechanisms of the socio-historical con­
ditionedness of philosophic knowledge” (MotroSilova 1990, 4). In
1991, she turned this theory into practice, trying to make ideas, taken 
from the history of philosophy, work in the actual historical situation, 
starting from her historical understanding of how ideas have been 
working. This turn was already announced in 1990:
The present investigation is an attempt at a new answer to this necessity of theory, 
which has fully practical and highly actual aspects as well. To understand classical 
German philosophy in the context of social development, in connection with the 
dialectic of history, means to turn to the clarification of more general mechanisms
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of the active influence of philosophy on its own epoch and on history as a whole. 
Such a clarification is urgently required from philosophy and culture in general in 
our time, fraught with unprecedented dangers for mankind (MotroSilova 1990,5).
In the course of her historical investigations, MotroSilova has devel­
oped a theoretical model of the interrelation [vzaimosvjaz’] of 
philosophy and the historical development of society, distinguishing 
three levels: civilization - epoch - historical situation. This model, 
receiving some theoretical elaboration in her book on classical 
German philosophy (Motro§ilova 1990, 6-10), is illuminating, and 
shows what one might call a realist interpretation of the Hegelian 
concept of epoch as a phase in the development of World Spirit, 
renamed ‘civilization’. The most general level thus is that of civiliza­
tion, “the dimension of the contradictory, spasmodic development 
of mankind since barbarianism” (MotroSilova 1990,6), a universal 
and generally progressive movement. This development takes place 
as the succesion of epochs, “large-scale stages in the development of 
human civilization” (MotroSilova 1990,9). Although the division of 
civilization into epochs is not strict, depending as it may on a choice 
of perspective (social-economic formations: feudalism, capitalism; 
cultural eras: Renaissance, Enlightenment; stages of technical devel­
opment: industrialization, technological revolution), these concepts 
are traditionally Hegelian. However, MotroSilova introduced a third 
level, implied by Hegel’s notion of concrete existence [Dasein] but 
hardly elaborated in his philosophy, viz. the level of historical situ­
ation. At this concrete level of historical existence of philosophical 
activity, regional, national, social, and personal factors come into 
play.
In 1991, she summarized this theoretical model in a description 
of selected chapters from the history of philosophy (MotroSilova 
1991, 9). But the same model can also help us understand what 
MotroSilova herself is doing. Human civilization has reached, in our 
epoch, a certain level, which, because it is attained in some places, 
is attainable for the world at large. This level of civilization - as a 
totality of ideas - is ‘at work’ in contemporary society. Our epoch 
is an epoch of vast technological possibilities and of an elevated 
level of possible social and economic well-being, of civil society, 
democracy, and freedom, but it is, at the same time, an epoch of 
nuclear threat, ecological disaster, mass violations of human rights,
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and of an actual social life that falls way short of what is attainable. 
This singles out the historical situation of Russia: it is a part of the 
world that not only “... lags behind contemporary standards and the 
high level of civilized being attained already” but in some respects 
“lags behind more and more” (MotroSilova 1990, 190). In such a 
situation the role of philosophy, in spite of the fact that it is part 
of civilization at large, is different, and must be different from the 
role it has in countries that are more or less at the level of attainable 
civilized being.
The central theoretical notion that links MotroSilova’s recent work 
with her previous work, is the basically Hegelian notion of ‘working 
ideas’. For Hegel, a ‘real’ [wirkliche, dejstvitel’naja] idea was a 
‘working’ [wirkende, dejstvujuscaja] idea; in MotroSilova’s words: 
“Those philosophical ideas that are immortal with regard to their 
profoundest meaning ... have the quality of being “working” ideas” 
(MotroSilova 1991, 6). The working ideas brought to the fore by 
MotroSilova - freedom, democracy, justice -, are gathered under the 
umbrella of civilization. MotroSilova thus tries to apply to present 
post-Soviet Russia what she has learnt from her historical studies: 
that humanist, ‘civilizational’ ideas have worked in the genesis of 
modem civil society, exemplified by the West, but also by Japan 
(MotroSilova 1991, 23), and that they have not worked in some 
mysterious way, behind our backs, but through the concrete thoughts 
and actions of people, living in concrete social-historical situations.
What MotroSilova is trying to do is to implant in her reader­
ship the idea of civilization, and to develop it in order to facilitate 
Russia’s “return to the road of world civilization” (MotroSilova 1991, 
23). In this respect, she acts as an ucitel’ naroda, a prosvetitel’ in 
the traditional sense. Personally, I feel inclined to think that this 
is not a philosopher’s task: let others (politicians, writers, priests) 
produce ideologemes, and let philosophers critically examine those 
ideologemes (without having the illusion, itself ideological, of ever 
putting an end to ideology as such). However, MotroSilova’s choice 
to let philosophy perform an edifying function is justified by her 
social-historical situation. Moreover, in presenting to her audience 
a number of independently thinking individuals as the ‘heroes of 
her narrative’, she implants in them the idea of free philosophical 
thought, too. Perhaps the lesson that can be learned from this is that
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philosophers can come to an understanding of how philosophy is 
conditioned by the social-historical situation it exists in, and that 
this brings them to a position where they can try to act upon their 
own historical situation.
This is the strength of her position: she explicitly seeks to influ­
ence her readers in the spirit of civilization, and she has every right to 
do so in virtue of her standing as a scholar. At the same time, it is what 
makes her position ‘risky’. Hie desire for civilization is so strong that 
perhaps both the author’s and readers’ eyes are blind to the fact that 
‘Civilization’ is a concept that, if uncritically employed, is vague, 
and easily used in an ideological way, if there is no critical thought 
to counter it. The best example of the ideological use of the idea 
of civilization is the justification it provided for the colonization of 
almost the entire non-European world. Western ‘civilization’ brought 
disease, alcoholism, and near-extinction to ‘uncivilized’ peoples, a 
process still under way in South America, Australia, and Siberia. 
The normative character of the concept of civilization gets blurred 
by the fact that it appeals to the positive feelings one has about it. It 
is a concept with a strong ‘ ideological aptness ’, since it can easily 
motivate and legitimize human actions, regardless of whether what 
is presented as civilized can indeed be seen as such.
While the idea of civilization has an exclusively positive content 
(relating all negative aspects to ‘barbarianism’), concrete civilization 
— states, groups of people, armies - may ‘employ’ this idea precisely 
because it is exclusively positive: there is nothing to say against 
it, which means that ‘barbarianism’ always has to disguise itself as 
civilization. MotroSilova seems to be well aware of this danger, 
when she states, displaying her Soviet experience, that “... they [the 
‘working’ philosophical ideas, EvdZ] are, by the way, even capable 
of ‘serving’ those who take them as ready-made canons, the philo­
sophical dogmatics of all times and nations” (MotroSilova 1991, 
6), rightly pointing out that it is a not only a naive, but also a 
harmful illusion to think wishfully that “somewhere behind a dis­
tant or near historical horizon a serene “bright future” awaits people 
. . . ” (MotroSilova 1991, 20). As not only Soviet history has shown, 
“massive barbarian relapses” (MotroSilova 1991, 19) are always 
possible, and to counteract these relapses is certainly a task of intel­
lectuals, including philosophers. However, what is to be regarded
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as relapse is never evident. Part of that endeavor is to investigate 
critically to what extent civilized society is true to its own idea, i.e. 
the ideas it professes (e.g., the idea of human rights), and this is 
a way to make those ideas work, but the same endeavor becomes 
uncritical when ideas like civilization, barbarianism, civil society, 
mankind, are taken as something substantial: even if they obtain, in 
the course of history, a life of their own, and in that sense transcend 
their concrete historical situation, they remain human creations, not 
discoveries.
Knowing, from historical studies as well as from their own Soviet 
experience that philosophy can only flourish under conditions of 
freedom - freedom of thought, i.e. lack of spiritual authority, to begin 
with, but freedom of expression, publication, and discussion, too - 
philosophers are ‘natural’ adherents of freedom and civil society. 
Now, since their activity can only be legitimized in terms of the 
ruling ‘ideology’ that corresponds to that civil society - let’s call it a 
pluralist, liberal ideology -, and since at the same time they are well 
aware of the fact that they live in a society that, to quote Me2uev, 
“does not even “smell of civilization”,”25 or that, in MotroSilova’s 
words, ‘lags behind contemporary standards and the high level of 
civilized being already attained,’ philosophers seek to provide and 
stimulate the civilizational ideology that would bring their country 
to a higher level and, at the same time, would be the appropriate 
background for their own activity and status as philosophers. At 
this point, MotroSilova’s position displays the same paradox as does 
Russian society at large: the gap between a high level of cultural and 
intellectual development, and a low level of social, political, and 
economic development, which is acutely perceived ‘from above’, 
but has to be remedied ‘from below’. The best, if not the only 
‘propaganda’ of civilization is its act, its reality, however limited 
in space and time it may be. Just as the only way to implement 
a market economy is to start producing and trading, and not by 
introducing it on a political level (the only things politicians can 
do is let it happen, relieve restrictions etc.), so the only way to 
let free philosophical thought develop is to be a freely thinking 
individual human being oneself, a point made in all clarity by Merab 
MamardaSvili (MamardaSvili 1989).26
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, I have moved from philosophy of law, via philosophy 
of history, to the working of ideas in history, and from the abstract 
demand for rule of law and legal ideology to the concrete, conscious 
employment of civilizational ideas by individual philosophers. The 
three topics I have discussed can be taken together and linked with 
the ‘ideological vacuum’ often referred to by post-Soviet Russian 
intellectuals. The Soviet system was ‘ideologized’ in the sense of 
being permeated by an official, party- and state-controlled, obliga­
tory, ‘Marxist-Leninist’ ideology, that was ideological at least in the 
sense of claiming to represent a scientific-philosophical world-view, 
motivating the Soviet people in all their political, economic, social, 
and intellectual activity, while in fact being a permanently adapted 
universal medium for the legitimation of the status quo. Moreover, 
this ideology was material in the sense of having a very definite 
content, viz. an allegedly true account of all natural and human 
reality. The disappearance of this ideology certainly created a 
vacuum. The question, however, is what it will be filled by: a similar 
ideology, of whatever content, or an ideology of a different, formal 
type?
The horror vacui of post-soviet Russia was pithily expressed 
by Vladimir Ivanovic Tolstykh (b. 1929) with the saying “A holy 
place is rarely empty [svjatoe mestopusto ne byvaet].”27 There have 
been attempts to fill this vacuum: for example, in 1994 Voprosy 
filosofii published an essay by Nikolaj Alekseevic Kosolapov, 
entitled ‘An Integrating Ideology for Russia: an Intellectual and 
Political Challenge’.28 But if in the above saying the present tense 
of the imperfective verb byvaf [to happen, to be present] is to make 
any sense, one may well assume that this vacuum has been filled 
already, only not by an explicit, positive, material ideology, but by a 
plurality of more or less elaborated, and more or less explicit ideolo- 
gemes, including that of the ideological vacuum, gathered under the 
umbrella of a. formal ideology of pluralism and freedom of thought. 
The horror vacui thus depends on the extent to which the self- 
proclaimed and carefully entertained Soviet conception of ideology 
is taken both as the ideological reality of the USSR and as the concept 
of ideology.
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In the examples discussed one perceives the force of the image of 
a vacuum in the trend among Russian intellectuals to produce a new 
ideology in the sense of an elaborate, positive doctrine. At the same 
time, the intellectual activity of, e.g., MotroSilova already partici­
pates in a kind of ideology that belongs to civil society, realizing it 
while taking an advance on its realization. Here, too, it is basically 
a matter of freedom, and not simply of freedom of expression and 
discussion, but of freedom of thought, i.e. the subjective freedom 
to let one’s thought take its course. But this means that one also 
has to relate freely to society and ideology. Put radically, one cannot 
contribute positively to society as a free person if one does not accept 
the possibility of disclaiming all possible social impact, whether 
‘positive’ or ‘negative’. The obligation or responsibility to produce 
a new ideology makes this very difficult. Moreover, in a pluralist 
society it is rarely if ever clear whether and how someone’s ideas 
work, just as one can never predict what the ultimate effects of one’s 
economic endeavors will be. This is at odds with the idea of the 
philosopher as a prosvetiteV naroda, an idea so dear to the Russian 
intelligencija, unless prosvescenie is understood precisely in the 
Kantian sense of ‘emerging from man’s self-incurred immaturity. ’29
MotroSilova’s approach illustrates the tension between the 
‘Western’ tradition of individual free thought, and the tendency, 
predominant in Russian and Soviet thought alike, to seek support 
for ideology in some epistemic authority, be it Christian Revelation, 
the genius of the klassiki marksizma-leninizma, or the tradition 'of 
humanist thinking. The immediate connection of Power and Truth is 
fundamentally at odds with the notion of civil society, which presup­
poses the coexistence and mutual recognition of different positions, 
that, in the end, cannot be founded in something else, and the recog­
nition of the direct link between ideological phenomena and political 
or material interests, in however an idealized form they may appear.
It is, I believe, a dangerous illusion to think that one can develop a 
new material ideology and have something like a civil society. Which 
amounts to saying that civil society, as much as a free philosophical 
culture and a free market economy, is not something that can be 
created or introduced, but that has to come into existence as the 
result of the ««concerted actions of a multitude of individual human 
beings, including the ideological effects of these actions. And it is
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only within the context of an already established civil society that 
‘integrating ideologies’ can be proposed without running the risk 
of repeating recent history by filling old forms with new contents. 
Russia is perhaps a unique case in that it can believe that it is facing 
a historical choice, whereas other countries either ‘just develop’ 
according to complicated logics that historians and philosophers are 
still unravelling, or are simply occupied, colonized, or otherwise 
incorporated in world history. The tragedy of this situation is that 
many people, especially intellectuals, think they have to choose a 
road for Russia, while in fact they have to wait and let happen, and, 
in the meantime, engage in their proper trade, i.e. the production 
and critique of ideas and theories that may, but need not, perform 
a significant ideological function, not subject to their will in either 
case. What they ‘ought to do’ is allow themselves this freedom, and 
think against any kind of ‘empire’,30 including that of Civilization.
4
NOTES
[abbreviations used: VF - Voprosy filosofii; FN - Filosofskie nauki; ON « 
ObSSestvennye nauki; SEET *»* Studies in East European Thought; SST - Studies 
in Soviet Thought; SGiP « Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo; VAN - Vestnik AN
SSSR]
1 For a more elaborate discussion see E. v.d. Zweerde, ‘Van heilstaat naar recht­
sorde: rechtsfilosofische thema’s in de hedendaagse sovjetfilosofie’, Tijdschrift 
voor Rechtsfilosofie en Rechtstheorie 1991, No. 3, pp. 177-198.
2 In. this manner, Nobel-prize winner Josif Brodskij was exiled for 5 years in 1964 
on the accusation of tunejadstvo - after massive protest he was allowed to return 
to Leningrad in 1965, and emigrated to the USA in 1972.
3 Cf. the chapter ‘The Human Rights Movement1, in: M. Meerson-Aksenov & B. 
Shragin (eds.), The Political, Social and Religious Thought of Russian “Samizdat” 
-An Anthology (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland Publishing Company, 1977), pp. 179- 
232.
4 In the standard work on Soviet philosophy by J.P. Scanlan, ‘philosophy of law’ 
is shown to be part of social and political philosophy, i.e. historical materialism,
4 the only fully monolithic and dogmatic field of Soviet philosophy * (Scanlan 1985, 
224); in 1990, the editors of VF stated that ‘presumably, it is difficult to find a 
... field of theory that has suffered more and was deformed more thoroughly by 
the ideological and political actions of Marxist dogmatics’ (Kruglyj stol 1990,3).
5 Pravo izakon [Right and Law] (Moskva: Nauka, 1983).
6 Cf. also VS. Nersesjanc, ‘Gegelevskaja dialektika prava: ètatizm protiv total- 
itarizma [Hegelian Dialectics of Right: Statism versus Totalitarianism]’, Voprosy 
filosofii 1975, No. 11, p. 145.
7 Solov^v, known for his biography of Luther (Nepobezdënnyj eretik [An
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Unbeaten Heretic] (Moskva: Molodaja gvardija, 1984)), was the author of the, 
at the time, unorthodox chapter on ‘Liônost’ [The Person]’ in the new official 
philosophy-textbook of the perestrojka years: I.T. Frolov e.a. (eds.), Vvedenie v 
filosofiju [Introduction to Philosophy], 2 vols. (Moskva: Politizdat, 1989), vol. 2, 
pp. 550-584; for a survey of the liënost’-problematic in late Soviet philosophy, 
cf. E.M. Swiderski, ‘How the Category of the Person is Accommodated in Soviet
Philosophy’, in: L.K. Sosoe (éd.), Identité: Évolution ou Différence? Mélanges 
en l'honneur du professeur Hugo Huber (Fribourg: Éd. Universitaires, 1989), 
pp, 55-78.
® The point that ‘ it is not essential for symbolic forms [that perform an ideological 
function, EvdZ] to be erroneous or illusory in order for them to be ideological* 
was rightly made by Thompson: ‘By treating error and illusion as a contingent 
possibility rather than a necessary characteristic of ideology, we can relieve the 
analysis of ideology of some of the epistemological burden with which it has been 
encumbered since Napoleon* (Thompson 1990,56).
9 The Soviet Constitution (Konstitucija 1988) warranted, in articles 40-47, the 
so-called second generation human rights, while art. 50 stated: Tn conformity with 
the interests of the people, and with the aim of consolidation and development 
of the Soviet system, freedom of expression, press, association, procession and 
demonstration are guaranteed to the citizens of the USSR/ Moreover, the articles 
about the rights, liberties, and obligations of the Soviet citizen were preceded by 
the general reservation that ‘the use of their rights and liberties by the citizens 
may not be at the expense of the interest of society and the state, of the rights of 
other citizens’ [art. 39].
10 An advocate of the necessity to let capitalism ‘follow the natural path of devel­
opment,’ including a ‘law-observing parliamentary state’ was G.V. Plekhanov, the 
‘father of Russian Marxism’ (Walicki 1992,83).
11 Equally manifest in the new philosophy-textbook, Vvedenie v filosofiju 
(Moskva: Izd, Polit. Lit., 1989).
12 Critical social and political thought is extremely rare in contemporary, post- 
Soviet Russian philosophy; an example is presented by Valerij Podoroga, e.g. in 
an interview entitled ‘Fenomen vlasti [The Phenomenon of Power]’, FN 1993, 
No. 1-3, pp. 44-55; during perestrojka, faithful Marxists like Anatolij P. Butenko 
made attempts in the direction of critical analysis of surrounding socio-political 
reality, but this current seems to have fallen silent.
13 H. Smeets, *Wij hebben in een soort druif geleefd [We have been living inside 
some sort of grape (interview with Merab MamardaSvili)]’, NRC Handelsblad, 9 
oktober 1990.
14 Cf., esp., Nersesjanc* vehement critique of the tacit appropriation, by the state 
and its representatives, of the previous ‘socialist property’ (Nersesjanc 1993, 3- 
14).
15 Cf. Kojève 1971, 436: ‘Si la soviétisation de la Russie et la communisa- 
tion de la Chine sont plus et autre chose encore que la démocratisation de 
l ’Allemagne impériale (par le truchement de l’hitlérisme) ou l’accession du Togo 
à l ’indépendance, voire l ’auto-détermination des Papous, c’est uniquement parce 
que l’actualisation sino-soviétique du bonapartisme robesperrien oblige l ’Europe 
post-napoléonnienne à accélérer l’élimination des nombreuses séquelles plus ou 
moins anachroniques de son passé révolutionnaire.’
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16 As Fukuyama pointed out recently, the statement about the end of history is 
not an empirical statement, but ‘a normative statement based in crucial ways on 
empirical evidence’ (Fukuyama 1995, 29): 'Empirical fact alone cannot prove or 
disprove its validity, except perhaps at the very unlikely extremes (that is, die com­
plete disappearance of liberal democracy, or the total universalization of it, or the 
appearance of an angel announcing the millennium). Empirical fact does not and 
cannot arm us with a deterministic methodology for predicting the future. What 
empirical fact can do, on the other hand, is to give us a greater or lesser degree of 
hope that the statement is true* (30). Now, whether or not we find this construction 
convincing (I do not: either the normative statement is acceptable as true, and then 
empirical evidence cannot be relevant, or it does depend on empirical evidence - 
inductive backing - but then setbacks in the development of liberal democracy are 
arguments against it; the third possibility, which was, I think, Hegel’s solution, is 
to make empirical development part of an intrinsically ‘normative process’, but 
this solution, one way or another relying on objective or absolute idealism, is not 
what Fukuyama opts for - indeed his Hegel is Kojöve’s ‘anthropologized Hegel’ 
(38)), and it is clear that Fukuyama does not claim a strong historicism for which 
actual developments in Russia and elsewhere would constitute a major problem.
17 F. Fukujama, ‘Konec istorii [The End of History]’, VF 1990, No. 3, pp. 134- 
148, Ju.A. ZamoSkin, ‘Konec istorii: ideologizm i realizm [The End of History: 
Ideology and Reality]’, VF 1990, No. 3, pp. 148-155.
18 V.M. Mefcuev, in: ‘Kruglyj stol: Umer li marksizm [Round Table: Has Marxism 
Died]?’, VF 1990, No. 10, p. 43.
19 Op. cit., p. 45.
20 N.V. MotroSilova (ed.), Studien zur Geschichte der westlichen Philosophie; 
Elf Arbeiten jüngerer sowjetischer Autoren (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 
1986); reviews by A. Schaefer, Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 41 (1988), Nr.2, 
pp. 160-162, H.E. Schiller, Das Argument 29 (1987),Nr.l63, pp. 430-432, and E. 
v.d. Zweerde, Zeitschriftfiir philosophische Forschung 43 (1989), Heft 4, pp. 705- 
709.
21 N.V. MotroSilova, Principy i protivoreöija fenomenologiöeskoj filosofii 
(Moskva: 1968).
22 N.V. MotroSilova,Puf Gegelja h Nauke logiki (Moskva: Nauka, 1984).
23 Cf. on the formation of the Sestidesjatniki, F.T. Michajlov, 'Umer li marks v 
Rossii [Did Marx die in Russia]?’, Filosofskie issledovanija 1993, No. 1, p. 87, or 
EJu. Solov’öv, in the selected materials from the ‘Umer li marksizm’-discussion, 
published in SEET 45 (1993), p. 39f [‘Umer li marksizm?’, was published in 
VF 1990, No. 10, pp. 19-51, a selection from much more extensive material; 
other selections appeared in Latinskaja amerika 1990, No. 5-6, and in: Mark- 
sizm: pro i kontra (M.: 1992)); a German translation of Solov’öv’s contribution is 
EJu. Solov’ev, ‘Die Illusion des proletarischen Messianismus’, in: A. Litschev,
D. Kegler (eds.), Abschied vom Marxismus; Sowjetische Philosophie im Umbruch 
(Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1992), pp. 48-59; a selective English translation 
can be found in SEET 45 (1993), pp. 1-133],
24 See N.V. MotroSilova, ‘Orientacii novoj liönosti i ikh vyraienie v filosofii 
öeloveka XVII stoletija [The Orientation of a New Personality and its Expres­
sion in 17th Century Philosophy of Man]’, in: N.V. MotroSilova (ed.), Istoriko- 
filosofskij eiegodnik ’86 (Moskva: Nauka, 1986), pp. 84-103, and idem, ‘UCenie 
o öeloveke v filosofii epokhi rannikh burfcuaznykh revoljucij [Theory of Man in
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the Philosophy of the Period of Early Bourgeois Revolutions]’, in: T.I. Ojzerman 
e.a, (eds.), Filosofija epokhi rannikh burzuaznykh revoljucij (Moskva: Nauka, 
1983), pp. 481-575; for a discussion, see E. v.d. Zweerde, ‘Discussion Review of 
Istoriko-filosofskij ezegodnik 1986\ 55737 (1989), pp. 30-32.
25 V.M. Mefcuev, in ‘Kruglyj stol: Umer li marksizm?’, VF 1990, No. 10, p. 45.
26 MamardaSvili is keenly aware of the fact that any philosophical culture is 
empty and sterile if it is not based on the act of philosophical thought (which is 
not to deny that a lot of other elements are important, too),
27 V.I. Tolstykh, in: ‘Kruglyj stol: Umer li marksizm?1, VF 1990, No* 10, p. 22.
28 E.g., N.A. Kosolapov, ‘Integrativnaja ideologijadlja Rossii: intellektual’nyj i 
politiCeskij vyzov [An Integrating Ideology for Russia: an Intellectual and Political 
Challenge]’, VF 1994,No. 1, pp. 3-24.
29 L Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, in: H. Reiss,
H.B. Nisbet (eds.), Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge, London, New York, 
Melbourne: Cambridge, (1970) 1977), p. 54, translation of ‘Beantwortung der 
Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?’, in: Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphiloso­
phie, Politik und Pädagogik 1 [Wilhelm Weischedel (ed.), I. Kant, Werkausgabe 
Band XI Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977], p. 53 [Akademie-Ausgabe 
A 481 ]: ‘ Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten 
Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne 
Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen. Selbstverschuldet ist diese Unmündigkeit, 
wenn die Ursache derselben nicht am Mangel des Verstandes, sondern der 
Entschließung und des Mutes liegt, sich seiner ohne Leitung eines ändern zu 
bedienen. ’
30 Cf. VA, Podoroga, ‘Fenomen vlasti [The Phenomenon of Power]’, FN 1993, 
No, 1-3, p. 55.
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